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ABSTRACT 
 
Cyberwarfare is quickly becoming the new norm in military 
action.  From Russia, to the United States, to China, states—as well 
as non-state actors—are invested in cyber weapons and cyber 
capabilities.  The legal world is struggling to keep up with this 
rapidly developing field and is currently engaged in the extended 
discussion of whether current international humanitarian law is 
sufficient to regulate the new field of cyberwarfare or whether an 
entirely new system must be created.  This Comment argues that 
current frameworks of international humanitarian law have the 
potential to regulate cyberwarfare, but they must be updated and 
revised in order to effectively do so. 
One major gap in international law regarding its application to 
the world of cyber is in the law of targeting.  Specifically, the 
current regulation of the targeting of dual-use objectives, and the 
current precautions that commanders must take before and during 
attacks, are insufficient and must be updated in order to apply to 
the cyber realm.  This Comment lays out a more explicit and 
revamped proportionality standard which should successfully 
mandate that commanders take into account various knock-on 
effects (secondary effects) when targeting a dual-use objective.  
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Additionally, this Comment suggests ways to change the 
precautions that a commander must take in targeting in order to 
avoid punishing states for investing in technological innovation.  
Finally, this Comment suggests the creation of panels of military 
experts, legal experts, and cyber experts, to approve all cyber 
targeting.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In today’s interconnected, heavily networked world, 
cyberwarfare has become one of the most common ways that war 
is waged, and its popularity and effectiveness is only growing.1  
The days of battlefield standoffs between infantry and tank 
brigades of opposing state armies and fighting in battles of attrition 
are quickly giving way to cyberwarriors: individuals, both state-
affiliated and non-state affiliated, sitting behind a computer screen, 
waging war from the comfort of their home.2  Cyberwarfare has 
become particularly attractive for a number of reasons.  First, it is 
cheaper to wage a cyberwar than a kinetic war.3  Attacks can be 
                                                             
 1 See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts, 
43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1011, 1012 (2010) (claiming that as of 2010 
approximately 140 states had developed cyber capabilities); see also Brian J. Egan, 
State Dep’t Legal Advisor, Address at UC Berkeley School of Law: International 
Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016) (“The remarkable reach of the 
Internet and the ever-growing number of connections between computers and 
other networked devices are delivering significant economic, social, and political 
benefits to individuals and societies around the world.  In addition, an increasing 
number of States and non-State actors are developing the operational capability 
and capacity to pursue their objectives through cyberspace.”). 
 2 Modern warfare is based on effects-based operations, rather than on battles 
of attrition.  The move from attrition-based warfare to effects-based warfare is 
very important.  In an attrition framework, “the enemy is defeated by 
progressively weakening its military.”  In an effects-based framework, 
“operations utilise selective targeting and choice of means and methods of 
warfare to achieve a desired effect.”  HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBERWARFARE 
AND THE LAWS OF WAR 23–24 (2012).  Technological advances have also “evolved 
the ability to wage war to the point where the concept of a line marking the heart 
of the battle no longer makes sense; battlefields have become multidimensional 
and entire countries have become the battlespace.”  Id. at 22.  This technology is 
“easy-to-use, and capable of deployment from virtually anywhere.”  Duncan B. 
Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2007). 
 3 See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 1, at 1013.  The cost-effectiveness of 
cyberwarfare is particularly attractive for weaker states or non-state actors who do 
not have access to the same resources that larger, better off states have.  Michael 
Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, 87 INT’L L. STUD 89, 102 
(2011); see also Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in 
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
885, 897 (“because of the potentially grave impact of CNA [computer network 
attack] on a state’s infrastructure, it can prove a high gain, low risk option for a 
state outclassed militarily or economically.  Moreover, to the extent that an 
opponent is militarily and economically advantaged, it is probably 
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made with the click of a mouse, rather than with expensive 
equipment and machinery.  This helps to level the playing field 
between sides with different economic resources.4  A poor state or 
a non-state actor can launch a cyber-attack against a state with a 
defense budget in the hundreds of billions,5 whereas in traditional 
                                                             
technologically-dependent, and, therefore, teeming with tempting CNA targets.”).  
Non-state actors can also benefit from the “open source” nature of cyber weapons.  
See Jack M. Beard, Legal Phantoms in Cyberspace: The Problematic Status of 
Information as a Weapon and a Target Under International Humanitarian Law, 47 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 67, 92 (2014) (“A powerful addition to the cyber 
capabilities of nonstate actors may ironically come from the arsenals of the most 
technologically advanced states.  Soon after powerful states use their most 
sophisticated cyber weapons, the information necessary to recreate these weapons 
may be readily available for downloading from the Internet.”). 
 4 Brian Contos, Analysis: Why Cyberwarfare is the Great Equalizer, USA TODAY 
(May 30, 2013), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/05/30/cyberwarfare-
developing-nations-use-of/2371687/ [https://perma.cc/9Y33-TUTT] (“The 
amount of resources and effort that a country must employ to launch a cyber-
attack is significantly lower than fielding tanks, launching satellites, developing a 
clandestine agency or refining uranium.”); see also Hollis, supra note 2, at 1033 
(cyber operations “presents . . . non-state actors new means for reaching and 
affecting nation-states”).  Poorer states and non-state actors also have less 
possibility of being significantly harmed by a cyber-attack as “emerging and 
frontier countries throughout parts of Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia are 
less dependent on computers.”  Id.  In contrast, “[c]yberattacks present a great risk 
to industrialized nations, which are highly connected and extremely dependent 
on computers from the electric grid and financial services to transportation and 
national defense.”  Id. 
 5 Compare Bad Guys Can Launch Cyber-Attacks for Just $6, REUTERS (June 15, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/15/bad-guys-can-launch-cyber-attacks-for-
just-6-dollars/ [https://perma.cc/K7DN-7AQG] (describing an online 
underground marketplace which sells access to more than 70,000 compromised 
servers for only $6 per server and noting that once purchased, the compromised 
servers come equipped with software to launch a variety of cyber-attacks; access 
to government servers is not much more expensive at only $7 per server), and 
Denis Makrushin, The Cost of Launching a DDoS Attack, SECURELIST, 
https://securelist.com/the-cost-of-launching-a-ddos-attack/77784/ 
[https://perma.cc/QH2X-HWC8] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (stating that the cost 
of launching a short attack against an online store is only $5 and that launching an 
attack using a botnet of 1,000 workstations can be as low as $7 per hour), with U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER/CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, PROGRAM 
ACQUISITION COST BY WEAPON SYSTEM: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET REQUEST (2017), 
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2
018_Weapons.pdf [https://perma.cc/344Z-UQ5S] (requesting $397.4 million for 
45 combat aircraft, as well as $3.4 billion for combat vehicles). 
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kinetic warfare they would most likely be overmatched.  Second, 
cyberwarfare is safer for the combatants involved than traditional 
kinetic warfare.  War can be waged from the comfort of one’s 
home, rather than on a traditional battlefield.6  This entails much 
less personal physical risk.  Third, it is very difficult to attribute a 
cyber-attack to a particular actor—state or otherwise—and 
therefore it is much more difficult to be held responsible for a 
cyber-attack and face the related consequences.7  Cyberwarfare is 
not fought face to face, and various techniques such as IP spoofing 
are available to help the attacker hide her true identity.8  Finally, 
with the increasing reliance on networks and electronic 
communications, the damage that can be done through cyber-
attacks has become truly devastating, and in many instances can be 
more effective than a traditional kinetic attack.9 
The rise of cyberwarfare leads to many new challenges, as 
scholars, states, and militaries scramble to figure out how to 
regulate this new type of technologically-advanced warfare.  The 
question of whether the current system of international 
humanitarian law is sufficient to regulate cyberwarfare, or whether 
a new regulatory system altogether is needed, is a question that is 
being hotly debated.10  Two distinct camps have emerged.  The first 
                                                             
 6 See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 1, at 1014 (“unlike their counterparts in 
traditional military organizations, cyber warriors operate remotely and launch 
cyberattacks from within the territory of their own nation-state.  The remoteness 
of cyberwarfare effectively eliminates the likelihood of injury or death in a 
physical encounter with forces from an opposing nation-state.”) 
 7 See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 1, at 1014. 
 8 See infra Section 2.4. 
 9 See HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBERWARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 12–
13 (2012) (discussing the increase in digitally stored information and computer-
run networks). 
 10 See generally Michael A. Newton, Proportionality and Precautions in Cyber 
Attacks, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY 
OF WAR 230 (Dan Saxon ed., 2013) (“the modern globally connected era driven by 
information and interconnected civilian and military communications 
infrastructures presents wholly new challenges for the lawful conduct of relations 
between states.”); Eric Boylan, Note, Applying the Law of Proportionality to Cyber 
Conflict: Suggestions for Practitioners, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 220–21 (2017) 
(“The absence of law specifically written or designed to deal with the nuances of 
cyber warfare, combined with the prevalent application of other fields that are 
only tangentially related, leads to a host of issues for practitioners in the realm of 
cyber warfare.”). 
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is made up of scholars who believe that current international law 
can and should be applied to regulate cyber operations.11  This 
camp can be divided into those who believe that international law 
as it currently stands is sufficient, and those who believe that 
certain updates must be made.  The second camp is made up of 
those who believe that the current legal structure cannot regulate 
cyber operations—even if updated— and a completely new system 
must be created.12  Defining “attack” in cyberwar and the 
difficulties of state attribution create serious problems.  However, 
these problems are beyond the scope of this Comment.13 
                                                             
 11 See Harold Hongju Koh, State Dep’t Legal Advisor, Remarks as Prepared 
for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) 
(“This is not the first time that technology has changed and that international law 
has been asked to deal with those changes.  In particular, because the tools of 
conflict are constantly evolving, one relevant body of law—international 
humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict—affirmatively anticipates 
technological innovation, and contemplates that its existing rules will apply to 
such innovation.”); see also Kate Jastram & Anne Quintin, Seminar at Berkeley 
Law: The Internet in Bello: Cyber War Law, Ethics & Policy (Nov. 18, 2011), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/cyberwarfare-
seminar-summary-complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XLC-GE5L] (“if cyber means 
and methods produce the same effects as kinetic operations, they are—and should 
be—governed by the same rules.”). 
 12 See Beard, supra note 3, at 70 (arguing that “due to the unusual properties 
of information itself, there are serious problems and perils in relying on such 
analogies to extend the IHL framework to most events in cyberspace.”); see also 
Michael Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello, supra note 3, at 106 (“The 
dilemma is that IHL was crafted during a period in which the cyber operations 
were but science fiction.”). 
 13 The Jus in Bello regulations in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols only apply when an armed conflict occurs.  Additional Protocol I 
applies in situations during an international armed conflict and Additional 
Protocol II applies in situations of non-international armed conflict.  For the 
purpose of this Comment, I assume that an international armed conflict is present 
and that the cyber-attacks and operations contemplated rise to the level of an 
armed attack necessary for an armed conflict to be present and to render the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I applicable.  For a more in-depth 
discussion of armed attack and armed conflict in cyberwarfare, see generally 
David Turns, Cyber War and the Concept of ‘Attack’ in International Humanitarian 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF 
WAR (Dan Saxon ed., 2013); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar?: 
International Law, Domestic Law, and Self Protective Measures, in CYBERWAR: LAW AND 
ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern & Claire 
Finkelstein eds., 2015); Beard, supra note 3; Yoram Dinstein, The Principle of 
Distinction and Cyber War in International Armed Conflicts, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY 
L. 261 (2012); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information 
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This Comment will argue that current international law can 
effectively regulate targeting in cyberwarfare, but that significant 
changes must be made in order to update it for the modern age of 
warfare.  The current framework of international humanitarian law 
has the capability of sufficiently regulating the problem of 
targeting, but it must be updated to match the realities of modern 
armed conflict.14  This Comment will address two main issues 
related to the law of targeting.  First, cyberwarfare exacerbates the 
dual-use problem that is also present in kinetic warfare.  The 
interconnectedness of the cyber realm leads to many more dual-use 
targets—targets that serve both a civilian and a military function—
than traditional kinetic warfare.  The regulation of targeting dual-
use infrastructure, and the proportionality assessment that goes 
along with it, must adapt for the reality that, arguably, almost any 
object can serve a military purpose.15  Second, the law governing 
what precautions must be taken by commanders and other officials 
who are responsible for ordering attacks is insufficient in the 
course of cyberwarfare.  The current precautions detailed in Article 
57 of Additional Protocol I create unacceptable disparities between 
technologically-advanced states and non-technologically-advanced 
states in the precautions they must take to determine and verify 
                                                             
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023 (2007); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer 
Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative 
Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (1999); Noam Lubell, Lawful Targets in 
Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of Distinction Apply?, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 252 
(2013). 
 14 Note that Additional Protocol I contemplates the development of new 
weapons and states that a party to the protocol must determine whether the new 
weapon would be prohibited by the protocol.  This suggests that the Protocol was 
developed with the intention and flexibility that it be modified and updated to 
keep up with advances in technology.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].  For a discussion of how Article 36 applies to 
cyber weapons, see Jastram & Quintin, supra note 11 (comments by Anne Quintin, 
Public Affairs Officer, International Committee of the Red Cross). 
 15 See Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Cyberwarfare: Applying the Principal 
of Distinction in an Interconnected Space, 45 ISRAEL L. REV. 381, 383 (2012) (“because 
of the systemic technological setup of cyberspace in times of an armed conflict, 
basically every cyber installation—possibly even cyberspace as such—potentially 
qualifies as a military objective.”). 
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objects of attack, and the means and methods of attack that must be 
used.  These imbalances are much more apparent and troublesome 
in cyberwarfare than in kinetic warfare and can punish states for 
technological investment.  This imbalance must be corrected 
through a more concrete, minimum standard of care that a 
commander is required to take to ensure that the object of attack is 
a military objective, and that the attack itself will not be otherwise 
unlawful in the methods and means used.  Additionally, due to the 
technical nature of cyberwarfare, commanders should have to 
receive approval of a panel made up of a lawyer, a cyber expert, 
and a military commander, before launching a cyber-attack.  This 
should make up for the knowledge gap that military technological 
innovation is bound to create. 
The increased confrontation with dual-use infrastructure and 
the unbalanced rules regarding precautions to be taken before an 
attack leave an unacceptable amount of discretion and open-ended 
analyses in the hands of commanders, who may or may not be 
sufficiently trained to make important decisions in cyberwarfare.  
This Comment argues that current international law has the 
potential to effectively regulate cyberwarfare and military 
commanders in the area of targeting but must be seriously updated 
in order to do so effectively. 
This Comment will proceed in four parts.  Part I discusses 
major types of cyber operations that have occurred in recent 
history and are frequently used.  Part II shifts to looking at the rise 
in investment in cyberwarfare capabilities, both domestically and 
internationally.  Two major cyber operations, Stuxnet and the 
Russia-Estonia incident of 2007 are also explained.  Part III looks at 
the current status of the regulation of targeting in international law 
and analyzes important provisions of Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Convention.  Part IV discusses two major ways in which 
the current regulation of targeting falls short in the cyber context.  
In this section, I suggest updates to the current regulatory 
framework in order to make it more effective.  Finally, I finish with 
a short conclusion. 
2.  TYPES OF CYBER OPERATIONS 
While there are many ways that states and non-state actors can 
launch cyber operations in an effort to harm an opposing force, 
there are four main types of cyber operations that occur today.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
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This Part will briefly outline denial of service attacks, malicious 
programs, logic bombs, and IP spoofing.  This is not intended to be 
an exhaustive detailing of all types of cyber operations, but instead 
it is intended to provide sufficient background information for a 
reader to understand how a cyber operation or cyber-attack could 
occur, how the law of targeting is affected, and in what manner 
certain updates would be beneficial. 
2.1.  Denial of Service (“DoS”) Attack 
A Denial of Service (“DoS”) attack is an attack that bombards a 
network with so many requests that access to the network or 
system is severely slowed down or interrupted.16  Take, for 
example, a network that receives, on average, fifty requests per 
hour.  Now imagine that the same network is bombarded with 
thousands of requests per minute.  The network then shuts down 
due to an inability to handle the increased activity, and whatever 
services the network offered or sites it supported, are rendered 
unavailable.  This can be incredibly important if governmental 
services websites are shut down, or an electronic banking network 
is shut down.  A good analogy for a DoS attack is a doorway faced 
with exponentially increased pedestrian activity.  If a few people 
try to enter through the doorway every minute or hour, it functions 
normally, but if thousands of people suddenly try to enter over the 
course of one minute, they will get stuck and will not be able to get 
through.  The doorway will be unable to fulfill its function of 
letting people through and accessing whatever is inside.  Its 
normal operation is disrupted.  This is a very popular form of 
cyber operation as it requires very limited resources to execute.  A 
permutation of the traditional DoS attack is a distributed denial of 
service (“DDoS”) attack.17  In a DDoS attack, many infected 
computers or systems attack one network or system.18  In this 
                                                             
 16 Ari J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under 
International Law, 63 A.F. L. REV 121, 134 (2009). 
 17 The famous cyber-attack in 2007 on Estonia by Russia is an example of a 
DDoS attack.  For a more detailed description of this attack, see infra notes 58-59 
and accompanying text. 
 18 See Schaap, supra note 16, at 134. 
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situation, the requests that will eventually shut down a network 
are coming from many different nodes, rather than from a single 
node.  A DDoS attack is tremendously difficult to stop, as blocking 
one infected source of the attack will not stop the attack.  The other 
thousands of nodes will continue to bombard the network with 
requests, even after one node is effectively neutralized. 
2.2.  Malicious Programs 
Malicious programs (often referred to as malware) are 
programs that either disrupt the normal functioning of computers 
or allow remote attackers to gain control of computers and 
manipulate them to disrupt their normal functioning.19  Malicious 
programs often work by deleting files or corrupting them to the 
point that they are unusable.  Examples of malware include 
viruses, worms, and Trojan horses.  A virus will attach to a 
program or file and in this way spread from computer to 
computer.  Viruses are attached to an executable file, meaning that 
it will only begin to infect a computer when a user opens or runs 
the malicious program.20  In this way, a virus may exist on a 
computer but remain dormant until a user activates the virus by 
opening or running the program.  A worm is similar to a virus but 
can travel without being activated by a user.  It can replicate itself 
without the infected program or file even being opened.21  A Trojan 
Horse is a harmful piece of software that is disguised as something 
that looks legitimate but in fact is just a piece of malware.22  A user 
is then tricked by the appearance of legitimacy into opening the 
program and activating the malicious program.  Unlike viruses and 
worms, Trojan Horses do not spread through infecting files or 
through self-replication.23  They need to be opened or downloaded 
in order to work. 
                                                             
 19 Id. at 135. 
 20 Id. at 136. 
 21 What is the Difference: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Bots?, CISCO, 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/virus-differences.html 
[https://perma.cc/992M-LDV5] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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2.3.  Logic Bombs 
A logic bomb is a malicious code that will execute its 
programmed task if a specific event occurs at a predetermined 
time.24  Examples of events that would trigger a logic bomb could 
be a certain time or date, a specific file being deleted, or a pre-set 
amount of disk space being filled.25  When the specific event occurs 
and the logic bomb is triggered, the logic bomb can perform a 
variety of different actions including deleting data or activating a 
DoS attack.26  Imagine a disgruntled employee who creates a 
malicious code to self-execute in the event that the employee is 
fired.  An example of the actual use of a logic bomb is a cyber-
attack that struck computers at three banks and two media 
companies in South Korea in March 2013.  The specified triggering 
event was a certain time and date, and once this specific time and 
date was reached, malware began to delete data from the 
computers.27 
2.4.  IP Spoofing 
IP spoofing occurs when an attacker impersonates a different 
machine by faking the IP address of a trusted source and then uses 
this fake IP address to gain access to a machine or network.28  The 
fake IP address then conceals the identity of the attacker or sender 
and makes it seem as if the information or virus being sent is 
coming from a trusted source or even from a machine within the 
receiver’s network.  IP spoofing is one of the most used methods of 
                                                             
 24 See Schaap, supra note 16, at 137. 
 25 Stephen Northcutt, Logic Bombs, Trojan Horses, and Trap Doors, SECURITY 
LABORATORY, https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/security-
laboratory/article/log-bmb-trp-door [https://perma.cc/6HZP-UAFP] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
 26 See Schaap, supra note 16, at 137. 
 27 Kim Zetter, Logic Bomb Set Off South Korea Cyberattack, WIRED (Mar. 21, 
2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/logic-bomb-south-korea-attack/ 
[https://perma.cc/CKN3-2DL8]. 
 28 What is IP Spoofing? IP LOCATION, https://www.iplocation.net/ip-
spoofing [https://perma.cc/L2VZ-8AHY] (last accessed Feb. 25, 2018). 
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carrying out an illicit cyber operation.  By engaging in IP spoofing, 
an attacker can make it very difficult for an attack to be attributed 
to him. 
3.  EXAMPLES OF CYBER OPERATIONS AROUND THE WORLD 
Over recent years, cyber operations29 have become a very 
popular way of waging warfare throughout the world.30  Across 
the globe, state, as well as non-state actors, have begun to invest 
                                                             
 29 Terminology is important in the cyber context.  Although the definitions 
of cyber operation and cyber-attack are hotly debated, and no one definition has 
been settled on, a useful starting place are the definitions offered by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in 2011.  In a memorandum, they state that a cyber operation is “the 
employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve 
military objectives or effects in or through cyber space.”  Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military 
Services Commanders of the Combatant Commands Directors of the Joint Staff 
Directorates: Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations (2011).  A cyber-attack 
is defined as “A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and 
intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber systems, assets, 
or functions.”  Id.  Cyberwarfare is defined as “An armed conflict conducted in 
whole or part by cyber means.  Military operations conducted to deny an 
opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems and weapons in a conflict.  
It includes cyber-attack, cyber defense, and cyber enabling actions.”  Id.  The 
Tallinn Manual defines a cyber-attack as “a cyber operation, whether offensive or 
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or 
damage or destruction to objects.” TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].  It is important to note in these definitions that cyber 
operations are a broader category that is inclusive of cyber-attacks.  Michael N. 
Schmitt argues that “A cyber operation, like any other operation, is an attack 
when resulting in death or injury of individuals, whether civilians or combatants, 
or damage to or destruction of objects, whether military objectives or civilian 
objects.” Michael Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello, supra note 3, at 94.  
For a more in-depth discussion of definitions and terminology in the cyber 
context, see Oona A. Hathaway & Rebecca Crootof, The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 817, 817 (2012) (examining cyber operations within the existing 
framework provided by the law of war, international treaties, and domestic 
criminal law); Daniel Hughes & Andrew Colarik, The Hierarchy of Cyber War 
Definitions, in PACIFIC-ASIA WORKSHOP ON INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INFORMATICS 
15 (2017) (analyzing the origins and patterns of usage of cyber terminology across 
over one hundred documents).  For a more detailed discussion of what actions 
rise to the level of a cyber-attack, see supra note 13. 
 30 See supra notes 2–9. 
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heavily in creating cyber capabilities, both offensive and defensive.  
As of 2013, more than 140 countries had some form of funded 
cyber development program.31  While many states have developed 
cyber capabilities, a few states have been leaders in technological 
development, innovation, and use in this field.  This Part will look 
at cyber operations and investment in cyber capabilities of China, 
North Korea, Russia, and the United States. 
3.1.  China 
China has stated that its goal is to “achieve global ‘electronic 
dominance’ by 2050.”  This would enable it to target the financial 
markets, military, critical infrastructure and civilian 
communications of other countries through cyber means.32  China 
is also extremely vulnerable to a cyber-attack since it has the 
world’s largest internet using population.  Therefore, it has also 
decided to invest significant funds in cyber defense.  Over the last 
fifteen years, China has engaged in a number of cyber operations 
such as “Titan Rain”33, “Aurora”34, “Night Dragon”35 and “Shady 
Rat”36.  Importantly, in 2015 China established the Strategic 
                                                             
 31 Peter Suciu, Why Cyber Warfare is So Attractive to Small Nations, FORTUNE 
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/21/why-cyber-warfare-is-so-
attractive-to-small-nations/ [https://perma.cc/5L26-6DCU]. 
 32 ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY 
ASSESSMENTS, CYBER WARFARE: A “NUCLEAR OPTION”? 27 (2012). 
 33 Titan Rain was a campaign of coordinated attacks originating in china and 
beginning in 2003 in which the hackers targeted American defense contractor 
computer networks in order to extract sensitive information.  It is disputed as to 
whether the attacks were an initiative of the Chinese government or were 
committed by individual Chinese citizens.  Id at 31–32. 
 34 Aurora was a cyber-attack occurring in 2009 in which a computer attack 
originating in China was able to penetrate Google, as well as other companies and 
organizations, and steal information.  Id at 35–37. 
 35 Night Dragon was a set of coordinated cyber-attacks aimed against global 
oil and energy companies. William Pentland, Night Dragon Attacks Target 
Technology in Energy Industry, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2011), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/02/19/night-dragon-
attacks-target-technology-in-energy-industry/#409e066c1d49 
[https://perma.cc/4U7Q-VPQH]. 
 36 Shady Rat was an operation, also occurring around 2009, targeting 
fourteen different countries through spear phishing that included an email with 
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Support Force (SSF) which guides its space and cyber missions.37  
The SSF has been described as an organization that “uniquely 
conducts several different missions simultaneously that in the U.S. 
would be happening at the National Security Agency, Army, Air 
Force, Department of Homeland Security, NASA, State 
Department and Cyber Command . . . .  If you combined all of 
those government entities and added companies like Intel, Boeing 
and Google to the mix, then you would come close to how the SSF 
is built to operate.”38  The creation of the SSF is part of a strategy to 
catch up to the U.S. in cyber capabilities.  In an effort to catch up, 
“China is improving training and domestic innovation to achieve 
its cyber capability development goals.  PLA [People’s Liberation 
Army] researchers advocate seizing ‘cyberspace superiority’ by 
using cyber operations to deter or degrade an adversary’s ability to 
conduct military operations against China.”39  The U.S. Department 
of Defense warns that “the PLA may seek to use its cyberwarfare 
capabilities to collect data for intelligence and cyber-attack 
purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-
based logistics, communications, and commercial activities; or to 
serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks 
during times of crisis or conflict.”40  China is a country with a 
history of cyber operations, that has made a commitment to 
expanding its future cyber capabilities. 
                                                             
malware.  Information obtained through this attack included “national secrets, 
source code, databases and SCADA configurations.”  See KREPINEVICH, supra note 
32, at 34–35. 
 37 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY 
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 34 (2017), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Po
wer_Report.PDF [https://perma.cc/9DCB-7DME].  Elsa Kania, a U.S. national 
security analyst, stated that while it is difficult to determine the budget or 
manpower of the SSF, she anticipated that both are sizable.  See Chris Bing, How 
China’s Cyber Command is Being Built to Supersede its U.S. Military Counterpart, 
CYBERSCOOP (June 22, 2017), https://www.cyberscoop.com/china-ssf-cyber-
command-strategic-support-force-pla-nsa-dod [https://perma.cc/4MHM-9SQS] 
(“I would anticipate that both will be sizable — given the SSF’s apparent scope 
and scale, as well as the importance of these missions”). 
 38 See Bing, supra note 37. 
 39 Id. at 51. 
 40 Id. at 59. 
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3.2.  North Korea 
North Korea is another country that has focused heavily on 
building cyber capabilities over recent years.  Much of North 
Korea’s cyber program was developed when Kim Jung Un came to 
power after his father’s death in 2011.41  The centerpiece of the 
North Korean cyber program is Bureau 121, an elite cyber unit 
comprised of North Korean Hackers.42  In 2014, Bureau 121 entered 
the international spotlight following a cyber operation on 
computers at Sony Pictures Entertainment.  Allegedly this hacking 
was in response to Sony’s release of “The Interview,” a comedy 
about an assassination attempt on Kim Jung Un.43  While the North 
Koreans have denied a role in this attack, overwhelming evidence 
points to their involvement.44  In addition to hacks against 
                                                             
 41 David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick & Nicole Perlroth, The World Once 
Laughed at North Korean Cyberpower. No More., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-
sony.html [https://perma.cc/2BVZ-JD6A]. 
 42 See Dave Lee, Bureau 121: How Good Are Kim Jong-Un’s Elite Hackers?, BBC 
NEWS (May 29, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32925503 
[https://perma.cc/F6W5-FZWY] (reporting on North Korea’s elite hackers).  The 
best computer science students in North Korea are chosen for this unit and are 
given additional training in countries such as China, Japan, or various European 
countries.  Id.  It is estimated that approximately 1,800 hackers make up this elite 
unit.  See Ju-Min Park & James Pearson, In North Korea, Hackers Are a Handpicked, 
Pampered Elite, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sony-
cybersecurity-northkorea/in-north-korea-hackers-are-a-handpicked-pampered-
elite-idUSKCN0JJ08B20141205 [https://perma.cc/C4N7-SVU5].  Many of these 
hackers learned their computer skills in New York universities while working for 
North Korean missions to the United Nations.  Sanger, Kirkpatrick & Perlroth, 
supra note 41. 
 43 See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered 
Cyberattack on Sony, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-
sony-hacking.html [https://perma.cc/8EE8-5CJ7S].  The attack caused the four 
largest movie theater chains in the U.S. to cancel showings of the movie.  Id. 
 44 See Press Release, FBI National Press Office, Update on Sony Investigation 
(Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-
sony-investigation [https://perma.cc/BSW8-9WHW]  (“As a result of our 
investigation, and in close collaboration with other U.S. government departments 
and agencies, the FBI now has enough information to conclude that the North 
Korean government is responsible for these actions.”); see also Sam Frizell, NSA 
Director on Sony Hack: “The Entire World is Watching”, TIME (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://time.com/3660757/nsa-michael-rogers-sony-hack/ 
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America, North Korea has allegedly committed cyber-attacks 
against South Korea, both in a series of DDoS attacks from 2009–
2011 and then again in 2013 with cyber-attacks targeting banking, 
media, and governmental targets in South Korea.45  Recently, the 
U.S., along with a number of other countries, accused North Korea 
of being behind the WannaCry ransomware attack.46  This attack 
targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating 
system and affected computers in over 150 countries.  In 2016 
General Vincent Brooks, Commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, 
told Senate leaders “While I would not characterize them [North 
Korea] as the best in the world, they are among the best in the 
world and the best organized.”47  North Korea is a good example of 
a relatively poor country seeking to level the playing field through 
the use of more cost-effective cyber-attacks.48  Cyber weapons are 
                                                             
[https://perma.cc/9DGS-EJ4J] (quoting NSA Director Michael Rogers, “I remain 
very confident: this was North Korea.”).  Some analysts and journalists argue that 
North Korea might not have been responsible for the attack.  See, e.g., Michael 
Hitzik, The Sony Hack: What if it isn’t North Korea?, L.A. TIMES, (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mh-the-sony-hack-20141219-
column.html [https://perma.cc/R298-8SQZ ] (detailing the concerns of some 
security experts regarding North Korean involvement). 
 45 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY 
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 11 (2013), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a596219.pdf [https://perma.cc/93UA-
93X3]. 
 46 See Thomas P. Bossert, It’s Official: North Korea is Behind WannaCry, WALL 
STREET J. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-official-north-korea-
is-behind-wannacry-1513642537 [https://perma.cc/H6XK-KZ23] (stating that the 
United Kingdom also agrees that North Korea is behind the attack); see also White 
House Says WannaCry Attack Was Carried Out by North Korea, CBS NEWS (Dec. 19, 
2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-house-says-wannacry-attack-was-
carried-out-by-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/2ENC-8HW4 ] (noting that 
Canada, New Zealand and Japan also agree that North Korea is behind the 
attack). 
 47 Paul Szoldra, A US Army General Says North Korea Has Some of the World’s 
Best Hackers, BUS. INSIDER (May 10, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-worlds-best-hackers-2016-5 
[https://perma.cc/8QKC-QGEG ]. 
 48 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY 
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2013), 
supra note 45, at 11; see also KREPINEVICH, supra note 32, at 76–77 (“What may prove 
significant is North Korea’s ability to execute a fairly sophisticated cyber-attack 
despite its status as one of the world’s most backward nations, especially when it 
comes to its IT infrastructure and the IT literacy of the vast majority of its people); 
Sanger, Kirkpatrick & Perlroth, supra note 41 (quoting Chris Inglis, a former 
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far less expensive for the relatively poor country to develop and 
since North Korea does not have very technologically-advanced 
infrastructure, it leaves them less open to a cyber-attack than a 
more developed nation.  North Korea’s cyber program has grown 
tremendously over the last decade, and experts expect it to 
continue to grow.49 
3.3.  Russia 
Russia has arguably the most sophisticated cyber capabilities of 
any nation.  Professor James Wirtz of the Department of National 
Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School has stated, 
“Russia, more than any other nascent actor on the cyber stage, 
seems to have devised a way to integrate cyberwarfare into a grand 
strategy capable of achieving political objectives.”50  In 2014, the 
Russian government announced that it was going to create a 
special military cyber unit which would be responsible for both 
offensive and defensive operations.  The original budget for this 
unit was to be approximately $70 million and was to be completed 
by 2017.51  Much of Russia’s governmental cyber capabilities are 
intertwined with the cyber capabilities of the Russian Business 
Network (RBN),52 a non-governmental criminal group based in St. 
                                                             
deputy director of the NSA, “Cyber is a tailor-made instrument of power for 
them . . . . There’s a low cost of entry, it’s largely asymmetrical, there’s some 
degree of anonymity and stealth in it’s use . . . . You could argue that they have 
one of the most successful cyber programs on the planet, not because it’s 
technically sophisticated, but because it has achieved all of their aims at very low 
cost.”). 
 49 See Sanger, Kirkpatrick & Perlroth, supra note 41. 
 50 James J. Wirtz, Cyber War and Strategic Culture: The Russian Integration of 
Cyber Power into Grand Strategy, in CYBER WAR IN PERSPECTIVE: RUSSIAN AGGRESSION 
AGAINST UKRAINE (Kenneth Geers ed., 2015). 
 51 MICHAEL CONNELL & SARAH VOGLER, CNA ANALYSIS & SOLUTIONS, RUSSIA’S 
APPROACH TO CYBER WARFARE 8 (2017), 
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-014231-1Rev.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FET9-USBW]. 
 52 It is unclear exactly what connection the Russian government has to the 
RBN and what influence they have.  See John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, 
Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008), 
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Petersburg.  Russia has been accused of using cyber-attacks 
alongside more traditional kinetic attacks.53  In its invasion of 
Georgia in the summer of 2008, Russia allegedly aided and 
complemented their ground invasion of Georgia with a series of 
DoS attacks designed to take down Georgian networks and 
websites.54  These DoS attacks often coincided with Russian air 
strikes, strengthening the case that the cyber-attacks were 
government sponsored attacks designed to aid in the overall 
campaign.55  Russia has also used cyber operations to coerce other 
states into taking certain actions that would benefit them.  In 2009, 
Russia launched a series of DDoS attacks against Kyrgyzstan, 
taking down websites and email accounts throughout the 
country.56  The attacks coincided with the Russian pressure on 
Kyrgyzstan to terminate U.S. access to an airbase at Manas, a city 
in Kyrgyzstan.  The U.S. had been using the airbase to aid in its 
military efforts in Afghanistan.  Shortly after these DDoS attacks, 
Kyrgyzstan ended U.S. use of the airbase.57  One of the earliest, and 
most famous, large scale cyber operations was Russia’s DoS attacks 
in Estonia in 2007.  In 2007, Estonian officials moved a Soviet-era 
memorial that celebrated an unknown Russian who died while 
fighting against the Nazi’s in World War II from Central Tallinn to 
a cemetery on the outskirts of the city.58  This led to violent, deadly 
                                                             
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html 
[https://perma.cc/GE5A-ZBLA]. 
 53 Russia uses cyber operations as a “multiplier, which is a military term that 
describes a weapon or tactic that, when added to and employed along with other 
combat forces, significantly increases the combat potential of that force.” See 
Schaap, supra note 16, at 133. 
 54 The DoS attacks succeeded in taking down important government 
websites and disrupting government communications.  See CONNELL & VOGLER, 
supra note 51, at 17. 
 55 See id. at 53–54.  While Georgia accuses the Russian government of 
carrying out these operations, the Russian government denies this.  See Markoff, 
supra note 52. 
 56 Id. at 55. 
 57 Id. at 56. 
 58 See David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 347, 349 (2013).  The attack coincided with the date that Russia 
celebrates Victory in Europe Day.  See Emily Tamkin, 10 Years After the Landmark 
Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/10-years-after-the-
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protests, and then to a series of DDoS attacks against Estonian 
government websites.  The volume of the attacks caused the 
websites to shut down for hours at a time over the course of 
weeks.59  Eventually NATO and the U.S. sent cyber experts to try to 
help Estonia.  Estonia has blamed Russia for the attack, but Russia 
has never taken responsibility.  Russia has also used cyber 
operations in order to achieve intended kinetic effects.  In 2015, 
Russia attacked Ukraine’s power grid through coordinated cyber 
operations.  They attacked three distribution centers of a Ukrainian 
power company in Western Ukraine.60  This caused major power 
outages throughout the country.  Perhaps Russia’s most famous 
cyber operations, though, have been its alleged attempts to 
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election.61 
3.4.  United States of America 
The U.S. also places great importance on developing cyber 
capabilities, both offensive and defensive.  In 2015 the Department 
of Defense listed three primary missions in cyberspace.  The first is 
to “defend its own networks, systems, and information.”62  The 
                                                             
landmark-attack-on-estonia-is-the-world-better-prepared-for-cyber-threats/ 
[https://perma.cc/L34E-NU2X]. 
 59 Id. at 350.  Online bank accounts and newspapers also became inaccessible 
during the attacks.  See Tamkin, supra note 58. 
 60 See CONNELL & VOGLER, supra note 51, at 20–21. 
 61 See Ellen Nakashima, Cybersecurity Firm Finds Evidence that Russian Military 
Unit was Behind DNC Hack WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2016) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cybersecurity-firm-
finds-a-link-between-dnc-hack-and-ukrainian-artillery/2016/12/21/47bf1f5a-
c7e3-11e6-bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.07a72e343410 
[https://perma.cc/8ASS-VB5H] (providing evidence showing Russia’s 
involvement with the hack of the Democratic National Committee); Adam Entous 
and Ellen Nakashima, FBI in Agreement with CIA that Russia Aimed to Help Trump 
Win White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-blames-putins-personal-
grudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/16/12f36250-c3be-11e6-
8422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html?utm_term=.8a7a37bec6a2 
[https://perma.cc/XG8B-KP48] (detailing FBI and CIA assessments of Russia’s 
involvement in the 2016 election). 
 62 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CYBER STRATEGY 4 (2015), 
http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-
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second is to “defend the United States and its interests against 
cyber-attacks of significant consequence.”63  This includes 
conducting cyber operations to counter an attack against the U.S. 
or U.S. interests.  The third mission is that DoD “must be able to 
provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations 
and contingency plans.”64  The DoD includes a special Cyber 
Mission Force (CMF) to help the DoD carry out its cyber mission.  
The CMF is made up of 6,200 people, including members of the 
military, civilians, and contractors.  Once fully completed and 
operational, the CMF will be composed of 133 teams, each with its 
own mission.65 
The U.S. has identified a number of key cyber threats which it 
must protect against.  These include countries such as Russia, 
China, North Korea, and Iran, as well as non-state actors such as 
ISIL and various criminal actors.66 
DoD’s budget reflects the growing importance it places on 
developing cyber capabilities.  In the budget request for 2017, 
Defense Secretary Ash Carter requested $6.7 billion for a cyber 
budget, a 15% increase over the previous year.67  Over the course of 
2017-2021, the budget would call for $34.6 billion to be spent on 
cyber capabilities.  Included in this budget are funds to support 
training, weapons development, deterrence capabilities, 
capabilities to disrupt incoming attacks, offensive capabilities, as 
well as funds to support research and development.68 
                                                             
strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KJV-
M9MB]. 
 63 Id. at 5. 
 64 Id. at 5–6. 
 65 Id. at 6–8.  As of June 2016, 46 of the 133 teams were fully operational.  See 
also William Matthews, Unpacking DoD’s Cyber Strategy and $6.7B Spending Plan, 
GOVTECH WORKS (Jul. 13, 2016), https://www.govtechworks.com/unpacking-
dods-cyber-strategy-and-6-7b-spending-plan/ [https://perma.cc/RC5B-3PE3]. 
 66 Id. at 8. 
 67 Matthews, supra note 65. 
 68 Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Submitted Statement to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on the FY 2017 Budget Request for the Department of 
Defense (Mar. 17, 2016), at 23–24, https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carter_03-17-16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2Z4M-ULWS]. 
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Importantly, in 2017 the DoD initiated a process to elevate U.S. 
Cyber Command to a unified combatant command.69  President 
Trump stated that “[t]his new combatant command will strengthen 
our cyberspace operations and create more opportunities to 
improve our nation’s defense.”70  The Cyber Command, led by the 
NSA director, was established in 2009 and is currently a 
subordinate Unified Combatant Command of U.S. Strategic 
Command.  The Cyber Command “plans, coordinates, integrates, 
synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the operations and 
defense of specified Department of Defense information networks 
and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military 
cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, 
ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the 
same to our adversaries.”71 
The United States, along with Israel, launched perhaps the 
most infamous cyber-attack to date, Stuxnet.  Stuxnet was a joint 
project between the U.S. and Israel to disrupt the Iranian nuclear 
program, initiated under the code name “Olympic Games” in 
2006.72  In 2010 it reached a computer through an employee flash 
drive in an underground Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz.73  The 
virus took the form of a worm that suddenly sped up and slowed 
                                                             
 69 The other Unified Combatant Commands are United States Africa 
Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), 
United States European Command (USEUCOM), United States Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM), United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), 
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM), United States Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM), and United States Transportation Command.  The most recently 
created was USAFRICOM in 2007.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNIFIED COMMAND 
PLAN,  https://www.defense.gov/About/Military-Departments/Unified-
Combatant-Commands/ [https://perma.cc/6E9S-KZTE] (showing the list of 
unified combatant commands). 
 70 Jim Garamone & Lisa Ferdinandi, DoD Initiates Process to Elevate U.S. Cyber 
Command to Unified Combatant Command, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1283326/dod-initiates-process-
to-elevate-us-cyber-command-to-unified-combatant-command/ 
[https://perma.cc/EP93-P2N5]. 
 71 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. CYBER COMMAND FACT SHEET (May 25, 2010), 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-038.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3L4H-9M4N] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
 72 Weissbrodt, supra note 58, at 351. 
 73 Id. 
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down the centrifuges being used to enrich uranium, causing the 
centrifuges to break.  Even though the centrifuge speed was 
rapidly changing, the worm was designed in such a way that the 
monitoring computers showed that the centrifuges were 
functioning at a normal speed.74  Eventually there was an error in 
the program that allowed the worm to spread, and it infected over 
100,000 computers worldwide.  The worm did prove to be effective 
though, and some claim that it set the Iranian nuclear program 
back by approximately 18 months.75 
4.  CURRENT REGULATION OF THE LAW OF TARGETING 
The law of targeting, and the principle of distinction, which 
calls for the distinction between combatants and military objectives 
on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on the other 
hand, is thought of as one of the most important, if not the most 
important principal in international humanitarian law.76  The 
principle was first stated in the preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg 
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight: “The only legitimate 
object, which States should endeavor to accomplish during war, is 
                                                             
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 352. 
 76 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 257 (July 8) (“The cardinal principles contained in the texts 
constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following.  The first is aimed at 
the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make 
civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are 
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”); Elizabeth 
Mavropoulou, Targeting in the Cyber Domain: Legal Challenges Arising From the 
Application of the Principle of Distinction to Cyber Attacks, 4 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 37 
(2015) (“the principle of distinction forms the cornerstone on which international 
humanitarian law stands.”); Alexandre Cabral Campelo Hierro Lopes, Conduct of 
Hostilities: Precautions in Attack (2015) (unpublished master’s dissertation, 
Universidade Catolica Portuguesa), 
https://repositorio.ucp.pt/bitstream/10400.14/20456/4/Conduct%20of%20Hosti
lities.pdf [https://perma.cc/N964-X6U6] (“The Principle of Distinction is one of 
the most important rules of IHL, having the responsibility of avoiding or at least 
reducing nasty consequences of war for the civilian population.”). 
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to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”77  It was further 
refined in the Hague Convention of 1899, revised in 1907, 
forbidding parties “[t]o employ arms, projectiles, or material 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”78 
Today, the principle of distinction, and the other laws 
regulating targeting in international armed conflicts are located in 
Part IV of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which 
specifically deals with the treatment of civilians.79 
Article 48 articulates the basic rule of respect for civilians and 
civilian objects, stating that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”80 
Article 51 deals specifically with the civilian population and 
states that civilians should not be made the object of attack unless 
they directly participate in the hostilities.81  Additionally, Article 51 
prohibits indiscriminate attacks, which are attacks that (a) are not 
directed at a specific military objective, (b) employ a means or 
method which cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or 
(c) employ a means or method that are of a nature to strike civilian 
objects and military objectives without distinction.82  Perhaps most 
importantly for the purposes of this Comment, Article 51 contains 
the principle of proportionality.  It states that, “an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
                                                             
 77 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 298. 
 78 Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. 
 79 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14. 173 out of 193 states are party to this 
Protocol.  Although certain notable states are not party to Additional Protocol I, 
they are still bound to follow the provisions as they are now reflective of 
customary international law.  See Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On 
Target”: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 379, 381 (2014) (Dispelling the notion that IHL targeting law is 
inapplicable in cases where a non-signatory state is involved, because Additional 
Protocol I is generally regarded as customary international law). 
 80 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 48. 
 81 See id. art. 51(1)–(3). 
 82 Id. art. 51(4). 
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which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated” is illegal and violates international 
law.83 
Article 52 importantly states that civilian objects should not be 
attacked, and then defines a military objective as, “limited to those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling 
at the time, offer a definite military advantage.”84  Additionally, 
Article 52 states that in the case of doubt as to whether an objective 
is being used for military or civilian purposes, it should be 
presumed to be civilian.85 
Article 54 calls for the protection of objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population.86 
Finally, Article 57 details precautions that commanders must 
take in planning and carrying out an attack.87  This Article calls for 
those who plan or decided upon an attack to (i) do everything 
feasible to determine that the objects or population under attack is 
civilian, and (ii) to take feasible precautions in choosing the means 
and methods of attack to minimize collateral damage.88  Article 57 
goes on to state that the duty to take precautions is an ongoing 
duty and an attack should be canceled if it becomes apparent that 
the target is not military or if the attack is expected to cause 
excessive collateral damage.  Finally, Article 57 states that when 
                                                             
 83 Id. art. 51(5)(b). 
 84 Id. art. 52(2).  Article 52(2) lists four ways that an objective could become 
military.  The commentary to Additional Protocol I discusses these ways further.  
Nature “refers to objects which, by their ‘nature,’ make an effective contribution to 
military action.”  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 636 
(Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I].  Location refers to objects that 
don’t have a military function, but contribute to military action based solely on 
where they are located.  Id.  Purpose refers to the intended future use of the object.  
Id.  This is differentiated from use which refers to the current use of the object.  Id.  
Civilian object is defined in the negative, as “civilian objects are all objects which 
are not military objectives.”  Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 52(1). 
 85 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 52(3). 
 86 Id. art. 54. 
 87 Id. art. 57. 
 88 Id. art. 57(2). 
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there is a choice between targeting military objectives that will 
provide a similar military advantage, the commander should 
choose to target the objective that will cause the least danger to 
civilians and civilian objects.89  While these Articles are designed to 
regulate traditional kinetic warfare, this Comment will argue that 
they do have the potential to also effectively regulate cyberwarfare, 
subject to updates in two important areas that will be detailed in 
Part IV. 
5.  THE LAW OF TARGETING IN CYBERWARFARE 
This Part will focus on the main theme of this Comment: that 
the current international law regulating targeting in cyberwarfare 
is insufficient and must be updated in order to regulate modern 
cyberwarfare.  So far, the most extensive work on regulating 
cyberwarfare has been the Tallinn Manual.  This project started in 
2009 when the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of 
Excellence (“NATO CCD COE”), based in Tallinn, Estonia, invited 
an independent group of international law experts to create a 
manual on regulating cyberwarfare.90  In 2013, this group 
published the first edition of the Tallinn Manual, which focused 
exclusively on cyber operations occurring in the context of armed 
conflicts.  In 2017, the group of experts published the second 
edition of the Tallinn Manual (“Tallinn Manual 2.0”) which 
supersedes the first edition and also discusses international law 
relating to cyber operations during peacetime.91  The Tallinn 
Manual is not binding, nor does it represent the opinion of any 
state or international organization.  It is intended to be “an 
objective restatement of the lex lata.”92  In writing the Tallinn 
Manual, the experts acted under the presumption that existing 
international law could be applied to cyber operations and saw 
their task as determining how existing international law applies in 
                                                             
 89 Id. art. 57(3). 
 90 See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29. 
 91 Id. at 3. 
 92 Id. 
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the cyber context.93  The Tallinn Manual 2.0 is made of 154 rules, 
and accompanying commentary in the categories of (1) General 
International Law and Cyberspace, (2) Specialized Regimes of 
International Law and Cyberspace, (3) International Peace and 
Security and Cyber Activities and (4) The Law of Cyber Armed 
Conflict.  This Comment recognizes much of the work of the 
Tallinn Manual as a good starting point and relies on a similar 
method of attempting to update existing international law for 
cyberwarfare, rather than developing a new system altogether. 
This Comment will discuss two different areas that must be 
updated.  Section 5.1 will discuss the targeting of dual-use 
objectives and will focus on the problems caused by the increased 
confrontation with dual-use objectives in cyberwarfare, as 
compared with traditional kinetic warfare.  Section 5.2 will argue 
that the rules regulating the precautions a commander must take 
before launching an attack, and while the attack is occurring, are 
insufficient for cyberwarfare.  This Section will argue that the 
current regulation encourages a race to the bottom and places an 
unfair burden on states and non-state actors that choose to invest 
in technological advancement.  In each case, this Comment argues 
that while the general framework of international humanitarian 
law, and specifically Additional Protocol I, has the potential to 
effectively regulate targeting in cyberwarfare, certain updates and 
modifications must be made to the Articles of Additional Protocol I 
in order to properly do so. 
5.1.  Targeting Dual-Use Infrastructure in Cyberwarfare 
The regulation targeting the dual-use objectives must be 
updated for cyberwarfare in order to take into account knock-on 
effects in the proportionality assessment, and to give commanders 
enough explicit guidance to determine whether their cyber-attacks 
pass the proportionality analysis. 
                                                             
 93 Id. 
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5.1.1.  The Exacerbation of the Dual-Use Problem in Cyberwarfare 
While dual-use objects and infrastructure are present in 
traditional kinetic warfare, they are far more prevalent in 
cyberwarfare.94  This is due to the increasing importance of the 
Internet, computer networks, and cyberspace in the 21st century.  
Often the military uses civilian networks for communications 
purposes.95  In fact, it is estimated that 98% of government 
communications travel through civilian networks and lines.96  
Additionally, the military relies heavily on civilian providers for 
military computer software and hardware, as well as related 
services and maintenance.97  The military information being sent 
over civilian lines and civilian networks includes, presumably, 
classified orders, instructions for carrying out military operations, 
and intelligence reports, all of which would be categorized as 
military objectives.98  While Additional Protocol I does not 
explicitly mention dual-use objects in its definition of military 
                                                             
 94 See Henry Shue & David Wippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities 
Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 559 (2002) (“as 
technologically developed societies become ever more dependent on the 
uninterrupted functioning of basic infrastructure for the satisfaction of both 
civilian and military needs, the problems posed by attacks on such infrastructure 
will only increase.”). 
 95 See Jastram & Quintin, supra note 11, at 3 (“Cyber space is characterized by 
interconnectivity.  According to a recent Department of Defense report, DOD 
employees operate 15,000 computer networks with 7 million computers at 
hundreds of locations around the world.  Nearly all military cyber infrastructure 
relies on civilian networks.”). 
 96 See Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of 
Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1533 (2010); see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected 
Consequences From Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard For Computer Network 
Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1158–59 (2003) (“unless an attack 
originates on a Department of Defense (“DOD”) computer and travels solely over 
military communications equipment to an enemy’s military communications 
network, it will at some point be conducted by some medium that is civilian in 
nature and therefore, involve civilian objects.”). 
 97 Jensen, Cyber Warfare, supra note 96, at 1533. 
 98 Id. at 1542. 
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objectives, it is well established that if an object has both a civilian 
and a military use, it should be considered a military objective.99 
The integration of civilian and military networks could 
potentially render almost any civilian object military.100  Just 
because a dual-use object is categorized as a military objective, 
however, does not necessarily mean that it can be attacked.  It is 
still subject to a proportionality analysis which weighs harm to the 
civilian population against the expected military advantage to be 
gained.  Specifically, the proportionality principle is stated as a 
prohibition on “an attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”101  If the harm to the civilian population is 
disproportionate to the expected military advantage, the attack is 
unlawful, regardless of whether or not the attack is against a 
military objective.102  While the proportionality assessment does 
reign in the potential for attacks on dual-use infrastructure, a more 
explicit and inclusive proportionality analysis is needed in the 
cyber context.  The current proportionality assessment as 
expressed in Article 51(5)(b) is too heavily dependent on the 
subjective analysis of a specific commander.103  It also is not 
                                                             
 99 See Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 15, at 389 (the general view appears to be 
that any military use, however minimal, would render a civilian object a military 
objective). 
 100 Id., at 389 (“It follows that in a future ‘cyber war’ the established 
definition of military objectives, despite striking an accepted balance between 
military needs for flexibility and civilian protection in traditional armed conflicts, 
could render basically every component of the cyber infrastructure a legitimate 
military objective”).  Specific examples of traditionally civilian objects that may 
fall into the dual-use category in cyberwarfare include “computer networks of 
certain research facilities, air traffic control networks that regulate both civilian 
and military aircraft, computerized civilian logistics systems upon which military 
supplies will be moved, electronic power grid control networks, communications 
nodes and systems, including satellite and other space-based systems, railroad 
and other transportation systems, civilian government networks, and oil and gas 
distribution systems.”  See Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra note 96, at 1159–
60. 
 101 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 51(5)(b). 
 102 See Schaap, supra note 16, at 157. 
 103 See Lopes, supra note 76 (“Its [the proportionality assessment’s] practical 
application is however very difficult for the concepts that form this principle . . . 
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structured to sufficiently take into account knock-on effects, which 
can be difficult to predict. 
5.1.2.  Attempts by the Tallinn Manual Experts to Regulate the 
Targeting of Dual-Use Objectives 
The Tallinn Manual attempts to regulate the targeting of dual-
use objects, and states in rule 101 that “[c]yber infrastructure used 
for both civilian and military purposes is a military objective.”104  
In this way it mirrors Article 52 of Additional Protocol I.  In the 
commentary to rule 101, the Tallinn Manual states that “[t]his 
principle confirms that all dual-use objects and facilities are 
military objectives, without qualification.”105  The Tallinn Manual 
contemplates the unique challenges that dual-use objectives pose 
in cyberwarfare, describing a network that is used for both civilian 
and military purposes.106  Unlike in traditional kinetic warfare, it 
may be impossible to differentiate which part of the network will 
carry military transmissions.  The Tallinn Manual states that “in 
such cases, the entire network (or at least those aspects in which 
transmission is reasonably likely) qualifies as a military 
objective.”107  Therefore, as long as it passes the proportionality 
analysis, it could legitimately be attacked as a military objective. 
While the Tallinn Manual provides a good starting place, in 
that it specifically refers to dual-use objectives, gives a general rule 
on how they should be treated, and discusses a few pertinent 
                                                             
are quite subjective.  It is indeed understandable that in some war situations, 
deciding if an attack will or will not have an excessive damage, might be an 
extremely complicated task.  Especially if we consider that the balance between 
excessive collateral damage and military advantage, is very thin and extremely 
subjective.”).  The proportionality analysis for a cyber-attack has the potential to 
be much more complicated that the proportionality analysis to be done for a 
traditional kinetic attack.  See Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra note 96, at 
1158–59 (“When using kinetic weapons, determining, at least in the short term, 
what injury and damage will occur can be much clearer.  This may not be so clear 
in relation to CNA.”). 
 104 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 445. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 446. 
 107 Id. 
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examples, it does not go far enough in its discussion of how to treat 
dual-use objects.  It still leaves the military commander with a very 
difficult proportionality assessment to make.  How is the 
commander to determine what the knock-on effects108 of a cyber-
attack will be?  How can the expected damage to be caused be 
estimated, especially when the commander may not have extensive 
experience in the cyber context, or have extensive examples of 
cyber-attacks and their potential destruction to draw on? 
5.1.3.  A More Explicit Regulation of Targeting and an Updated 
Proportionality Standard 
A more explicit regulation is needed for the proportionality 
analysis to be undertaken in the event of an attack on a dual-use 
objective, a regulation that takes away some of the uncertainty and 
human error inherent in the proportionality analysis.109  This 
proportionality analysis must explicitly direct the commander to 
take into account both direct effects of the attack, as well as knock-
on effects that could possibly occur.110 
In allowing the standard to be inclusive of knock-on effects in 
an age of cyberwarfare, where the effects may be more difficult to 
predict, the wording of the proportionality principle must also be 
changed so that it limits an attack which risks causing collateral 
damage, rather than its current regulation against an attack which 
                                                             
 108 Knock-on effects refer to secondary or indirect effects. 
 109 See Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163 
(2011) (“For critics and defenders alike, it is evident that the application of the 
principle of proportionality is highly contingent on interpretation, context, and 
ultimately, the development of a sub-codex of rules for particular 
circumstances.”). 
 110 The inclusion of indirect effects is discussed and adopted in the Tallinn 
Manual, but the calculation of how they should work alongside direct effects, or 
how a military commander should calculate them is not discussed.  TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 472.  In discussing precautions a commander must 
take to reduce collateral damage, the Tallinn manual states that, “the issue of 
indirect effects is central to cyber operations because of the interconnectivity of 
cyber infrastructure, particularly between military and civilian systems.”  Id. at 
480. 
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“may be expected” to cause collateral damage.111  In this way it will 
be more inclusive of harder to predict knock-on effects, and will 
direct a commander to more deeply examine the wide range of 
potential knock-on effects that could be present in the event of a 
cyber-attack. 
A commander must also be able to properly differentiate 
between different types of knock-on effects and weigh them 
accordingly based on the likelihood of occurrence.  Collateral 
damage that is directly expected as a result of a cyber-attack 
should be evaluated differently than knock-on effects which are 
fairly unlikely to occur, but which could potentially occur.  In 
accordance with this comparison, knock-on effects should be 
classified into three different categories: (1) knock-on effects likely 
to occur, (2) knock-on effects that could reasonably occur, and (3) 
knock-on effects which could potentially occur.  These should be 
differentiated from direct effects and collateral damage anticipated.  
The greatest weight in the proportionality equation, after direct 
effects and collateral damage anticipated, should be given to those 
knock-on effects which are likely to occur, followed by knock-on 
effects that could reasonably occur, and then lastly knock-on effects 
which could potentially occur.  Each commander must be forced to 
do the proper assessment taking into account each of these 
categories before an attack can be ordered. 
The collateral damage and potential harm to civilians (the 
combination of the direct effects and the various categories of 
knock-on effects) must then be weighed against the concrete and 
direct military advantage expected.  Unlike the calculation of 
potential collateral damage, which must include collateral damage 
that may potentially occur but might be unlikely to occur, the 
calculation of military advantage should be based only on a 
concrete and direct advantage anticipated.  It should not take into 
                                                             
 111 The “risks causing” standard was contemplated by several states in 
drafting Additional Protocol I.  See ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I, supra note 
84, at 2209 (“Some would have preferred the words ‘which risks causing’ rather 
than ‘which may be expected to cause’.”).  The new proportionality principle, as 
expressed in Article 51(5)(b) would then be a prohibition on “an attack which 
risks causing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  See id.; Additional Protocol I, 
supra note 14, art. 51(5)(b). 
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account potential advantages that could possibly be gained but 
that are unlikely. 
Therefore, the specific proportionality analysis to be done in 
the context of an attack on a dual-use object in cyberwarfare, 
would be a balancing on one side of direct effects, likely knock-on 
effects, reasonably possible knock-on effects, and potential knock-
on effects, against direct and concrete military advantage.  For 
example, the equation could be expressed as:  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡	𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 4 ∗(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡	𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙	𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) + 3 ∗(𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑜𝑛	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦	𝑡𝑜	𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟) + 2 ∗(𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑜𝑛	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑	𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑦	𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟) +(𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑜𝑛	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑	𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦	𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟).  The estimate of 
direct collateral damage would be multiplied by four, the knock-on 
effects likely to occur would be multiplied by three, the knock-on 
effects that could reasonably occur would be multiplied by two, 
and finally the knock-on effects that could potentially occur would 
be multiplied by one.  This would demonstrate the relative 
importance of each category.  These figures would then be added 
together.  If the left side of the equation outweighs the right side of 
the equation, the attack would be permissible since the concrete 
and direct advantaged anticipated would be greater than the 
potential collateral damage.  If the right side of the equation 
outweighs the left side of the equation, the attack would be 
rendered impermissible. 
Consider, for example, a cyber-attack on the computers of air 
traffic control center A in an effort to take down a specific 
airplane.112  The concrete and direct advantage anticipated would 
be causing the specific airplane that has been identified as a 
military object (perhaps it is carrying weapons or enemy soldiers) 
to crash.  The direct collateral damage anticipated might be 
whatever damage the airplane would cause when it crashes.  The 
knock-on effects likely to occur might be damage caused to other 
airplanes that are controlled by the same air traffic control center.  
Knock-on effects that could reasonably occur would be damage to 
                                                             
 112 A cyber-attack on an air traffic control center is certainly not a far-flung 
hypothetical.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-221, INFORMATION 
SECURITY: FAA NEEDS TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS 
(2015). 
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airplanes controlled by other air traffic control centers, but which 
might be affected by the airplanes controlled by air traffic control 
center A.  Knock-on effects that could potentially occur, would be 
those effects generally resulting from decreased use and efficiency 
of the airspace in the region of control center A.  The commander 
would then weigh and compare the direct and concrete military 
advantage obtainable through the attack, against the direct 
collateral damage and knock-on effects.  The same exercise could 
be done for a cyber-attack that doesn’t cause any direct physical 
damage, but only causes physical damage as a knock-on effect. 
For a less hypothetical example, it is useful to consider the 
Stuxnet virus.113  Recall that Stuxnet was a joint American/Israeli 
project, created in an effort to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program.  
While many would declare Stuxnet a success—in that by many 
estimates it set the Iranian nuclear program back by one and half to 
two years—it did have unintended consequences and eventually 
led to the infection of over 100,000 computers worldwide.  Looking 
at the new, more explicit proportionality equation stated above, the 
left side of the equation would consist of the concrete and direct 
advantage anticipated.  This would be the disruption of the Iranian 
nuclear program.  The right side of the equation would consist of 
the various levels of potential knock-on effects, as well as the direct 
collateral damage anticipated.  The damage to the facility would 
fall into the category of direct collateral damage anticipated.  
However, In the case of the Stuxnet, the knock-on effects reached a 
very wide and dispersed audience, due to an engineer who took 
his computer home with him and then ended up infecting over 
100,000 computers worldwide.  It seems likely that the virus might 
spread to other computers in Iran, which it did at a high rate.  The 
infections in Iran would fall into the category of knock-on effects 
likely to occur.  Yet it seems much less likely that the virus would 
spread to computers in Bahrain, Ecuador, and Singapore—which it 
also did.  These infections would fall into the category of knock-on 
effects that could potentially occur.  If the commanders who 
ordered the Stuxnet attack had followed the updated, more explicit 
proportionality test proposed by this Comment, they would have 
had to take into account the wide range of collateral damage and 
                                                             
 113 See supra Section 3.4. 
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knock-on effects that the attack risked causing, weighted them 
properly, and then balanced them against the concrete and direct 
advantage anticipated.  If the direct and concrete advantage 
anticipated outweighed the direct collateral damage and the 
knock-on effects, the attack would be permissible.  If not, the attack 
would be impermissible. 
The practical result that this updated proportionality principle 
should have is to diminish the number of cyber-attacks that can be 
taken against dual-use objects, as well as to require that a 
commander do an extremely thorough analysis before ordering an 
attack.  The updated proportionality standard will have a higher 
likelihood of resulting in no attack being ordered.  The detailed 
equation and categorization should force commanders to consider 
all potential damage and require them to be especially diligent in 
accounting for knock-on effects, which are very prevalent in the 
cyber context. 
There are two related counter arguments to the updated 
proportionality principle as I have expressed it.  The first would be 
that commanders are neither skilled enough nor tech-savvy 
enough to accurately give numerical weight to the different types 
of knock-on effects.  One solution to this problem would be, as will 
be discussed further in Section 5.2, to mandate that every cyber-
attack be approved by a panel made up of (1) a lawyer, (2) a 
military commander, and (3) a cyber expert.  Another possibility 
would be to mandate the creation of a detailed manual, expressing 
what weight should be given to different potential knock-on 
effects.  The manual would give extensive examples of cyber-
attacks and the effects they could create.  It would be written by a 
group of international experts, similar to the group that wrote the 
Tallinn Manual.  In order to effectively balance the proportionality 
equation, the commander would only have to insert the types of 
relevant effects and their weights.  The second counter argument 
would be that due to the difficulty of cyber-attacks passing the 
proportionality threshold, commanders would revert to ordering 
traditional kinetic attacks at a higher rate.  There are two responses 
to this counterargument.  First, if the commander has succeeded in 
accurately balancing both sides of the proportionality equation, 
and the cyber-attack doesn’t pass, he should not order the cyber-
attack.  This does not mean that he can immediately order a kinetic 
attack.  The kinetic attack will have to pass the proportionality 
analysis as well.  If, however, the cyber-attack doesn’t pass the 
proportionality assessment because the commander is unsure of 
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how to weigh each effect, and he therefore chooses to resort to a 
more familiar kinetic attack, this is the type of problem the panel 
and the detailed manual are intended to solve.  If a commander can 
rely on the manual to appropriately weigh direct effects and 
knock-on effects, he should be expected to reach an answer 
regarding whether the objective can be targeted by performing the 
proportionality analysis. 
5.2.  Taking Precautions When Attacking a Target: Correcting the 
Imbalance 
The current precautions that commanders must take before 
launching a cyber-attack, as well as the ongoing precautions they 
must take during the course of an attack, are unfit for modern 
cyberwarfare and have the potential to hold more technologically-
advanced states—or states who invest heavily in military 
technology—to an unfairly high standard when compared to states 
that are less technologically-advanced or choose not to invest in 
cyber capabilities.  While this is problematic even in traditional 
kinetic warfare,114 the damage it causes is exacerbated in the much 
more technologically-advanced cyber context.  The current 
regulations also give too much decision-making power to military 
commanders who may or may not be technologically proficient or 
have a sufficient understanding of cyber weapons or cyberwarfare.  
The relevant legal structure must be revised to hold all nations to a 
minimum standard of conduct, as well as to ensure that 
commanders and decision makers have the qualifications and 
information necessary to make important decisions in the cyber 
context. 
                                                             
 114 For an in-depth discussion of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
(CDRs) in a non-cyber context, see Blum, supra note 109.  Blum specifically 
discusses both the compliance with the proportionality principle, as well as 
precautions to be taken before launching an attack and during the course of the 
attack, as examples of standards that could be interpreted as putting unequal 
weight on different actors.  Blum also analogizes to International Environmental 
Law and International Trade law as areas where differential standards are 
becoming widely accepted. 
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5.2.1.  A Problematically Differentiated Standard 
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
mandates certain precautions that commanders must take both 
before ordering an attack, as well as during the course of an attack.  
Those who plan or decide upon an attack (presumably military 
commanders) must do everything feasible to verify that an objective 
is military and not civilian and take all feasible precautions 
regarding the means and methods of attack to minimize collateral 
damage.  Additionally, they must cancel an attack that is already 
underway if they realize that they are attacking a civilian objective 
or if they believe that the attack will fail the proportionality test.115  
                                                             
 115 Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 57(2)(a)(i–iii).  Different states 
have unique definitions for how the word “feasible” should be interpreted.  
Canada’s Use of Force Manual states that, “‘Feasible’ is understood as that which 
is practicable or practicably possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling 
at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.  Planners and 
commanders are expected to act reasonably and in good faith.  Decisions 
concerning the use of force shall be reached on the basis of an assessment of the 
information reasonably available at the relevant time and that such decisions 
cannot be judged on the basis of information which has subsequently come to 
light.  Reasonable, good faith efforts must be made to gather intelligence and to 
review the available intelligence.  This standard is one of ‘reasonableness’, not 
‘perfection’.  The test for determining whether the required standard of care has 
been met is an objective one: ‘Did the commander, planner or staff officer do what 
a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances?’” DEP’T OF NAT. 
DEFENCE (CAN.), CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF, B-GJ-005-501/FP-001, USE OF FORCE 
FOR CF OPERATIONS §112.6 (2008).  Australia’s Defence Force Manual defines 
feasible as “precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into 
account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations.”  AUSTL. DEFENCE FORCE, OPERATIONS SERIES, ADFP 37, MANUAL ON 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1994).  Leading up to the signing Additional Protocol I, 
the United Kingdom stated that, “the word ‘feasible’ means that which is 
practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances at the 
time including those relevant to the success of military operations.” United 
Kingdom, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I, 28 Jan. 1998. The commentary to Additional Protocol I 
states that the UK’s definition is too broad by including considerations “relevant 
to the success of military operations,” but it stated that the “interpretation will be 
a matter of common sense and good faith.”  ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I, 
supra note 84, at 681–82.  The United Kingdom eventually conceded to the 
adoption of the ICRC’s standard.  In the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the feasibility requirement stated that “A military 
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and 
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Finally, they are required to take feasible precautions in choosing a 
means and method of attack to minimize collateral damage.  The 
feasibility requirement of Article 57 requires commanders to 
display a certain specified conduct rather than achieve a particular 
result.116  Based on the information at their disposal, they must do 
everything feasible to verify the status of an object, decide on the 
means of attack, and ensure that the attack is lawful while it is 
occurring, as well as that circumstances haven’t changed which 
would necessitate canceling the attack.117  The information 
available to a commander in making these decisions is dependent 
upon the technology and information-gathering capabilities he is 
provided with.118  Presumably, the more information available to a 
commander, and the better quality the information is, the better he 
can comply with his legal obligations.  Since Article 57 is conduct-
                                                             
evaluate information concerning potential targets.  The commander must also 
direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets 
during operations.”  ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established 
to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
para. 29. 
 116 The reliance on a conduct standard is in stark contrast to “[m]any IHL 
norms [which] are articulated in absolute terms: the intentional killing of civilians 
is always a war crime, the use of chemical and biological weapons is absolutely 
prohibited, the torture of prisoners of war or civilians is never lawful, and the 
carrying out of attacks while posing as a civilian is illegal perfidy.”  Blum, supra 
note 109, at 186. 
 117 In today’s interconnected world, an unprecedented amount of 
information is available, and this information can be “gathered, assessed and 
disseminated remotely at a very fast rate.”  Kimberly Trapp, Great Resources Mean 
Great Responsibility: A Framework of Analysis for Assessing Compliance with API 
Obligations in the Information Age, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 
CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF WAR 153, 154 (Dan Saxon ed., 2013). 
 118 Id. at 164; see Jen-Francois Queguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing 
the Conduct of Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 797 (2006), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_864_queguiner.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RZR9-5NZN] (“The obligation to verify the nature of the 
objective to be attacked obviously requires that close attention be paid to the 
gathering, assessment and rapid circulation of information on potential targets.  
These activities are naturally dependent on the availability and quality of the 
belligerents’ technical resources.”); see also Beard, supra note 3, at 106 (“To the 
extent that feasibility relates to making an ‘informed decision’ in this context, it 
will focus on what cyber intelligence-gathering operations must or can be 
conducted in order to make that informed decision.”). 
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based and not result-based,119 compliance with Article 57 is 
determined based on the process followed and not the result 
achieved.  Presumably, a commander who took all feasible 
precautions before launching a cyber-attack would not be found to 
be in violation of Article 57, even if the attack ended up causing 
tremendous collateral damage.120  On the other hand, a commander 
who caused very little collateral damage, but did not take all 
feasible precautions could be found to have violated Article 57.  
Similarly, since it is widely agreed upon that cyber weapons have 
the ability to be more precise than traditional kinetic weapons and 
therefore cause less collateral damage121—and Article 57 calls on 
commanders to use the means and methods of attack which will 
cause the least collateral damage—it would seem that once a 
country developed a precise, technologically-advanced cyber 
weapon, it would be limited to using this weapon over other 
kinetic weapons which might be less precise and cause more 
collateral damage.122 
                                                             
 119 See also Trapp, supra note 117, at 155 (“The distinction between obligations 
of conduct and obligations of result is derived from the Civil Law tradition and 
turns on an analysis of whether the primary rule requires absolutely that State 
conduct produce a certain result (obligation of result), or whether it requires only 
that a State make certain efforts to produce a desired, but uncertain, result 
(obligation of conduct).”). 
 120 See generally Queguiner, supra note 118, at 810 (“The basic challenge raised 
by the expression ‘feasible’ is in determining whether, and to what extent, it can 
be interpreted as legitimizing mistakes.  For example, information sought and 
gathered in good faith may lead a party to believe that an object is a military 
objective, while in fact it is entirely civilian in nature.”). 
 121 See DINNISS, supra note 2, at 183; Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra 
note 96, at 1168 (2003) (“CNA [Computer Network Attack] provides a relatively 
bloodless means of attack compared to traditional means of force.”) 
 122 See Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra note 96, at 1169 (2003) (“Once 
the commander has shown the capability to limit the use of kinetic force by 
advanced weapons technology, some will say that he is now required under 
humanitarian law to exercise that option in every case.”); Queguiner, supra note 
118, at 802 (“It has also been argued that imposing an obligation to use the most 
precise weaponry possible would have the perverse effect of slowing the 
development of sophisticated and expensive weapon systems.  By avoiding the 
development of advanced systems, a party could lawfully use weapons that are 
less precise and much cheaper, thereby lowering its precision standards when 
applying the proportionality principle.”); Eric Jaworski, “Military Necessity” and 
“Civilian Immunity”: Where is the Balance?, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 175, 201 (“A strong 
requirement of using the best possible technology may actually create a world 
where some nations are held to a higher standard of care regarding the rule of 
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Based on the current structure of Article 57, a state with 
significant intelligence-gathering capabilities and advanced 
technology in the cyber realm will be held to a much higher result 
standard than a country will lesser capabilities.123  A state that 
invests billions of dollars in technologically-advanced intelligence 
gathering capabilities, and other cyber capabilities, will be 
expected to use those resources to ensure that their actions are 
lawful and minimize collateral damage, while a state who chooses 
not to make these investments will be held to a much lower 
standard and will be given more leeway to launch attacks that 
don’t completely verify that the target is a military objective and 
that collateral damage will be minimized, or to launch attacks 
using a means or method that causes more extensive collateral 
damage.124  The conduct expected of a commander in a 
technologically-advanced state necessary to comply with Article 57 
will be much higher than the conduct expected from a commander 
in a less technologically-advanced state.125  This seems to 
                                                             
proportionality than others based solely on the higher level of technology at their 
disposal.”); DINNISS, supra note 2, at 213 (“Ironically, the requirement for an 
attacker to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of 
warfare may require that states that have the ability to launch computer network 
attacks to use that ability in preference to more traditional means.”). 
 123 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE 
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 228 (1977) (”[Article 57] will apply in accordance 
with the limits of capability, practical possibility and feasibility of each Party to 
the conflict.”).  Gabriella Blum discusses this problem in a non-cyber context 
saying, “[c]apabilities raise expectations: the greater intelligence and precision 
capabilities a military possesses, the greater expectation that it will use them to 
avoid civilian harm.”  Blum, supra note 109, at 194. 
 124 Trapp, supra note 117, at 166 (“The less technologically advanced a State 
Party to an armed conflict, the more discretion military commanders will have in 
deploying particular resources to gather relevant precautionary measure 
information.”).  The commentary to Additional Protocol I noted that a Party with 
technological capabilities must use them, stating that “it is reprehensible for a 
Party possessing such means not to use them.”  ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL 
I, supra note 84, at 600.  Discussing this asymmetry, the commentary notes, “one 
delegation remarked that the identification of objectives depended to a large 
extent on the technical means of detection available to the belligerents.  This 
remark seems to be correct.  For example, some belligerents might have 
information owing to a modern reconnaissance device, while other belligerents 
might not have this type of equipment.”  Id. at 682. 
 125 This would apply to various provisions of Article 57.  Presumably a 
commander in a more technologically-advanced nation would have better access 
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incentivize a race to the bottom, and disincentivize technological 
advancement.  A party who chooses not to invest in developing 
technological capabilities would not be shackled and constricted in 
the same manner as a party that does not.  We should avoid 
“disincentivizing” states from developing cyber capabilities in this 
manner. 
5.2.2.  Attempts by the Tallinn Manual Experts to Regulate 
Necessary Precautions 
The Tallinn Manual discusses the application of Article 57 in 
the cyber context, although it does not discuss the potential race to 
the bottom or the inequality between technologically-advanced 
states and less technologically-advanced states.  The experts break 
Article 57 into a number of different rules including: (1) Rule 114: 
Constant Care,126 (2) Rule 115: Verification of Targets,127 (3) Rule 
116: Choice of Means or Methods,128 (4) Rule 117: Precautions as to 
Proportionality,129 (5) Rule 118: Choice of Targets,130  (6) Rule 119: 
                                                             
to information to help him determine from the outset whether an object is a 
military objective, he will have more precise means of attack to help him minimize 
collateral damage, and he will have better access to incoming information as the 
attack develops which will help him decide whether to cancel or suspend the 
attack if he realizes it will not pass the proportionality analysis. 
 126 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 476 (“During hostilities involving 
cyber operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, 
individual civilians, and civilian objects.”). 
 127 Id. at 478 (“Those who plan or decide upon a cyber-attack shall do 
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians 
nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection.”). 
 128 Id. at 479–80 (“Those who plan or decide upon a cyber-attack shall take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means or methods of warfare employed in 
such an attack, with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, 
incidental injury to civilians, loss of civilian life, and damage to or destruction of 
civilian objects.”). 
 129 Id. at 481 (“Those who plan or decide upon attacks shall refrain from 
deciding to launch any cyber-attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”). 
 130 Id. at 481 (“For States Parties to Additional Protocol I, when a choice is 
possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military 
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Cancellation or Suspension of Attack,131 (7) Rule 120: Warnings,132 
and (8) Rule 121: Precautions Against the Effects of Cyber 
Attacks.133  Importantly, the Tallinn Manual discusses the word 
“feasible” in the cyber context as “that which is practicable or 
practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at 
the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”134  
The Tallinn Manual also lists examples of what taking feasible 
precautions might look like in the cyber context.135  Importantly, 
the Tallinn Manual states that “there is no obligation to take 
measures that are not feasible.”136 
5.2.3.  Revising Article 57 and Necessary Precautions 
There are a few ways that this problem of misaligned 
incentives and the potential race to the bottom that is created by 
                                                             
advantage, the objective to be selected for cyber-attack shall be that the attack on 
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian 
objects.”).  The experts involved in writing the Tallinn Manual could not come to a 
consensus as to whether this rule (which is based on Article 57(3) of Additional 
Protocol I), had become part of customary international law and therefore applies 
to states who are not party to Additional Protocol I.  A majority of the experts 
thought that it had become customary international law.  Id. at 482. 
 131 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 483 (“Those who plan, approve, or 
execute a cyber-attack shall cancel or suspend the attack if it becomes apparent 
that: (a) the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection; or (b) 
the attack may be expected to cause, directly or indirectly, incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof 
that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”). 
 132 Id. at 484 (“effective advance warning shall be given of cyber-attacks that 
may affect the civilian population unless circumstances do not permit.”). 
 133 Id. at 487 (“The parties to an armed conflict shall, to the maximum extent 
feasible, take necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual 
civilians, and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting 
from cyber-attacks.”). 
 134 Id. at 479 (quoting the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996). 
 135 Id. (examples include “gathering intelligence on the networks through 
mapping or other processes in order to allow those responsible reasonably to 
determine the attacks likely effects, particularly on the civilian population or 
civilian objects.”). 
 136 Id. 
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Article 57, could be solved.  First, Article 57 could be revised to 
institute a minimum standard of care that every commander must 
abide by when taking precautions before launching an attack and 
during an attack.  This would ensure that states investing in 
technology and cyber capabilities are not punished for their 
decision to invest as all states would be held to a higher standard.  
It might also serve to encourage less technologically-advanced 
states to invest in cyber capabilities.  One way to institute this 
minimum standard would be to introduce a detailed check list of 
specific tasks that need to be completed by a commander before an 
attack is launched and in order to monitor an attack while it is 
occurring.  This list of specific tasks would be the same for all 
states, regardless of their level of technological advancement. 
A second solution would be to replace the word “feasible” with 
a stronger adjective that would not be dependent upon the 
resources of the specific country.  Perhaps, mandating that a 
commander take all “necessary” precautions in the choice of means 
and methods of attack and do everything “necessary” to verify that 
objectives to be attacked are military and not civilian, would take 
the subjectivity out of the standard.137  It is important to note that 
“necessary” was the specific adjective used in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia case of Prosecutor v. 
Tadic.138 
Finally, changing the standard from a conduct-based standard 
to a results-based standard would help prevent the 
disincentivizing of technological advancement.139  If the 
                                                             
 137 The relevant portions of Article 57 would then read that (1) a commander 
must do everything necessary to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and (2) that commanders must take all necessary 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack. 
 138 ”In the conduct of military operations . . . all necessary precautions 
should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilian populations.” 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm 
[https://perma.cc/65T9-K3NJ]. 
 139 A move to a result-based test would more closely mirror the rest of 
international humanitarian law.  See Blum, supra note 109, at 165 (“Some 
exceptions notwithstanding, IHL obligations bind all parties equally, regardless of 
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“feasibility” requirement was replaced by a specific result 
requirement (perhaps mirroring the proportionality requirement, 
stating that precautions must be taken to ensure that collateral 
damage is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated), states would not be held to a 
lower standard for not developing cyber capabilities. 
5.2.4.  Ensuring Capable Decision Makers 
In addition to updating Article 57 to remove the potential race-
to-the-bottom problem, Article 57 must be revised to require states 
to ensure that the people tasked with making decisions and 
carrying out attacks are, pursuant to Article 57, capable of making 
decisions relevant to a cyberwarfare scenario.  Commanders 
making decisions regarding Article 57 precautions are held to a 
standard of reasonableness regarding their assessment of the 
targetable status of an object and whether or not an attack will pass 
the proportionality requirement.140  Reasonableness is an 
overbroad standard that must be defined more specifically. 
One way to remedy this deficiency would be to mandate that 
the “reasonable” commander or decision maker have familiarity 
with technology and cyberwar capabilities and problems.  
Commanders who are trained in kinetic warfare and have 
extensive knowledge and experience in kinetic warfare aren’t 
necessarily equipped to order and evaluate more technologically-
advanced cyber-attacks.  Commanders who have less cyber 
knowledge and experience should be required to consult more 
closely with advisors and reports that can help inform them and fill 
the information gap. 
A second way to ensure that commanders are able to make 
intelligent and legal targeting decisions would be to require every 
cyber-attack to be approved by a panel comprised of a lawyer, a 
cyber expert, and a military commander.  This would ensure that 
the attack is approved by people with sufficient knowledge and 
                                                             
the type of way they fight, the justness of their respective causes, or the disparities 
in power and capabilities between them.”). 
 140 See Trapp, supra note 117, at 164. 
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expertise to determine that the necessary precautions have been 
taken and that the attack will be legal. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Modern warfare is rapidly becoming more technologically-
advanced and cyber-attacks are becoming the norm, rather than 
the exception.  Dozens of countries have developed cyber 
capabilities, and many states have begun to heavily invest in cyber 
weapons and cyber defense.  Although many scholars argue that 
an entirely new system of international humanitarian law is 
needed to effectively regulate cyberwarfare, it is this Comment’s 
belief that an updated version of the current international law, 
namely Additional Protocol I, is sufficient.  The Tallinn Manual has 
made a good start, but it has not gone far enough.  Specifically, in 
the law of targeting, two important updates must be made. 
First, the law of targeting must be updated to take into account 
the targeting of dual-use objectives.  While dual-use objectives are 
present in traditional kinetic warfare, they are far more prevalent 
in cyberwarfare, and the civilian and military parts of the objective 
are more difficult to separate.  In order to effectively regulate the 
targeting of dual-use objectives, the traditional proportionality 
principle, found in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I must be 
updated.  It must first expand its ability to include hard-to-predict 
knock-on effects by substituting the “expected to cause” standard 
with a “risk of causing” standard.  The new standard would then 
prohibit “an attack which may risk causing incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  In addition to 
this change, an explicit equation must be added to the 
proportionality principle which requires commanders to take into 
account and properly weigh not only direct collateral damage, but 
also likely knock-on effects, reasonably possible knock-on effects, 
and potential knock-on effects.  These must then be weighed 
against the direct and concrete military advantage that an attack 
would produce.  In making this assessment, the commander would 
be required to consult with a panel which would include himself, a 
lawyer, and a cyber expert. 
Second, the precautions a commander must take before 
ordering an attack, after an attack has begun, and in choosing the 
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means and method of attack, must be updated.  The current 
standard risks penalizing states for technological innovation, for 
developing more precise cyber weapons, and for developing 
enhanced intelligence gathering means to determine whether an 
objective is military or civilian.  There are a few possible ways to 
revise this standard.  First, Article 57 could be revised to institute a 
minimum standard of care that commanders must meet when 
taking precautions for an attack.  This minimum standard would 
be the same for all states.  Second, the word “feasible” in Article 57 
could be replaced with the word “necessary” — revising the 
relevant standard so that commanders must “do everything 
necessary to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special 
protection but are military objectives” and “take all necessary 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a 
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” 
Finally, the precautions standard could be improved by changing it 
from a conduct standard to a result standard and mandating a 
specific result. 
Overall, the result of these revisions would be to update 
international humanitarian law to specifically take into account the 
interconnectedness of cyberspace and the dangers posed by a 
world of military commanders inexperienced in cyberwarfare. 
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